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Abstract 
This paper examines whether the establishment of the 
euro caused structural breaks in the main macroeconomic 
relationships of member countries. It compares eight original 
members of the common currency with four European 
countries that did not join. The analysis constructs 
counterfactuals using both single equation models and a six 
equation vector autoregression with foreign exogenous 
variables, VARX*, explaining output, inflation, equity 
prices, exchange rates and short and long interest rates. It 
considers which equations changed the most and the most 
likely dates for any structural break.  
JEL Classifications: C5, E5, F4 
Key Words: euro, structural-breaks, GVAR 
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1 Introduction  
This paper attempts to examine the effect of the establishment of the euro on eight 
economies that joined the common currency in comparison to four European 
economies that did not join the euro. There are very many ways to measure the effect of 
the euro and the most common way is to compare the outcome with some 
counterfactual, though constructing macroeconomic counterfactuals raises various 
difficult issues. Here we will use a very specific measure of the effect. We examine the 
extent to which joining the euro changed the main national macroeconomic 
relationships, that is whether there was a structural break in particular equations. We 
will ask: whether there was a significant break in 1999 for the economies that joined the 
euro and whether any break was bigger for those countries that joined than for 
countries that did not join. We also consider: in which equations the largest break 
occurred and whether the break was in 1999, or at another time. 
The answers to these questions will always be conditional on other influences that 
we control for. We always control for foreign variables, the 2008 crisis, for instance, 
was global. Of course, to the extent that the foreign variables were also influenced by 
the formation of the euro we do not pick up that indirect effect. We also consider 
controlling for policy instruments, interest rates and exchange rates, which, once the 
common currency was established, might be regarded as exogenous to many, if not all, 
individual euro countries. There is also an issue as to whether to use a simple single 
equation approach of the sort discussed in Pesaran and Smith (2016) or a full system of 
the sort discussed in Pesaran and Smith (2018). Simple single equation models are 
parsimonious, there is a lot of evidence that parsimonious models forecast better and 
counterfactuals are conditional forecasts. On the other hand the systems allow for more 
feedbacks. We will use both. 
Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 describes the data and provides some 
descriptive statistics and history. Section 4 uses single equations models and examines 
the timing of structural breaks. Section 5 describes the econometric approach adopted 
for the systems analysis. Section 6 provides results for systems. Section 7 contains 
some concluding comments.  
 
2 Literature  
There is a large literature on the euro which considers such issues as whether the euro is 
an optimal currency area and the extent to which its members are subject to symmetric 
shocks. De Grauwe (2018) provides a text-book treatment of the economics of the 
monetary union. While a single currency means equality of nominal interest rates and 
exchange rates, it does not mean real equality. Real interest rates and real exchange 
rates diverged substantially among the euro economies. In addition, the differences in 
size, factor endowment productivity and political environment of the euro economies 
mean that a “one size fits all” setting of monetary policy is unlikely to be optimal for all 
members. The interest rate chosen by the ECB may be too low for booming countries 
and too high for those in recession. 
Indeed, a common currency does not translate into equality among EMU members. 
Creditor countries tend to have more power and try to impose tight fiscal disciplines on 
debtor countries, De Grauwe (2016). During the Euro-crisis at the end of the 2000s, this 
pushed the Southern countries, that were already suffering from liquidity crisis, into a 
deeper recession, as they were forced to reduce wages and price level relative to the 
creditor members of the union. Greece is not one of the countries in our sample, but 
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Alogoskoufis (2019) examines the economic history of Greece over the past 40 years 
and concludes that despite the significant constraints implied by membership, there are 
bigger risks in leaving the euro area. 
Aksoy et al. (2001) noted that the determinants of the optimal interest rate are 
country-specific and this may raise tension within Euroland when it comes to choosing 
the optimal monetary policy for the system. Following Rudebusch and Svensson 
(1999) they developed a model which approximates an ECB optimal linear feedback 
decision rule. They found that the spread between nationally desired interest rate and 
the one decided by the ECB is wider for smaller countries in the union. Moreover, this 
difference tends to be larger when countries that desire to stabilize their output find it 
impossible to choose their optimal interest rate and hence left in frustration unable to 
achieve their objective. Nonetheless, the authors claimed that having the ECB to 
choose the optimal interest rate for the union based on economic conditions of all the 
countries in the system improves welfare by reducing losses from the volatility of 
inflation and variability of output. These tend to be higher when the choice of the 
interest rate is based on the nationalistic objectives. 
There are also issues about the implications of a common monetary policy for fiscal 
policy and whether fiscal federalism is required, Farhi and Werning (2017). Single 
currency members are not able to issue debt in a national currency making them 
susceptible to self-fulfilling liquidity and solvency crises as investors are lacking a 
guarantee that cash will be available at the maturity date. This may push interest rates 
up and reduce liquidity available to the euro countries, De Grauwe (2013). Monetary 
union prevents members devaluing their currency, to remedy declining relative 
competitiveness. Instead, governments are forced to push their price level down by 
reducing the wages leading them to a deeper recession. Thus the economy’s ability to 
defend itself against asymmetric shocks is tightly connected to the flexibility of its 
wages and price level. 
De Grauwe and Ji (2013) provide evidence for the fragility hypothesis. They 
analysed the government bond markets of the EMU countries and used a control group 
of 14 ‘stand-alone’ developed countries for comparison. ‘Stand-alone’ countries 
demonstrated much higher ability to sustain their sovereign debts as increase in their 
debt to GDP ratios was not perceived by financial market participants as a sign of 
increased fragility. As a result these countries overcame 2010-11 crisis without a 
noticeable increase in the interest rate spread. In contrast, the euro countries 
experienced a break in the spreads-debt to GDP ratio in 2010-11 as their financial 
vulnerability increased substantially when they accumulated public debt during times 
of financial distress. Thus, EMU countries are more prone to self-fulfilling liquidity 
crises. 
Saka, Fuertes and Kalotychou (2014) provided further empirical support for the 
fragility hypothesis. Using a capital asset pricing model, they found evidence for the 
herding contagion that was effectively countered by the timely and reassuring ECB 
announcements that helped to reduce investors fear of losses and effectively addressed 
self-fulfilling nature of the crisis during late 2000s. Nevertheless, the analysis relies on 
the influence of Spain-specific news on market participants and might have been 
different if the estimations were based on the news of other EMU members. 
Potjagailo (2017) noted that monetary shocks generated within the Eurozone tend 
to spillover on the ‘stand-alone’ European countries. The size of the spillover effects on 
each individual country depends on country-specific characteristics, such as its 
openness to trade. However, in case of majority of countries under consideration, 
financial variables, including short interest rates and real effective exchange rates, are 
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significantly affected by the shocks originated in the Eurozone. As for common 
currency unions, when member economies are pushed ‘out of sync’ by shocks that are 
permanent, not only the nature, De Grauwe (2016), but also direction and extent of 
these shocks matter when estimating their effect on the flexibility-symmetry trade-off 
(Campos and Macchiarelli, 2018). 
Those are mainly macroeconomic issues. The benefits of a monetary union may lie 
at the microeconomic level, De Grauwe (2018). A single currency aids free movement 
of goods and capital inside the EMU and reduced uncertainty about expected exchange 
rate. Hence, an increased economic efficiency for all the members in the monetary 
union. 
Campos and Macchiarelli (2018) argue that creation of EMU improved the stability 
of the Euro Area. They distinguish between core, deep-rooted periphery and a mixed 
set of countries. The authors found that an economy is more likely to be a core country 
if it was a euro member and had strict product market regulations in place. The euro 
countries benefit from reduced transaction costs and uncertainty about exchange rate, 
as well as from price transparency, higher trade and competition. However, to fully 
enjoy the perks of being an EMU member, an economy needs to be able to achieve a 
minimum combination of symmetry, flexibility and openness. 
There has been considerable dispute about the effect of monetary union on trade 
and Rose (2017) analyses the factors that cause the estimates to vary so much. It 
appears that estimates are sensitive to the sample size with the effects of a single 
currency on trade being stronger if the analysis includes more observations by country 
and time. The number of countries included seems to make especially substantial 
difference, which, as Rose suggested, might be explained by the bias in the estimation 
of the country-time fixed effects that arises if some smaller economies are omitted from 
the sample. 
Besides development of the monetary union, various global disturbances could 
have affected welfare of the Euro members over the period covered in this paper. The 
Euro countries were not exempt from the harsh effects of the global crisis 2007-08. 
Caruso et al. (2018) analysed the effects of the financial crisis 2007-08 on the Euro 
countries. Using a multivariate VAR model they performed conditional and 
unconditional forecasts in order to examine a special nature of a financial crisis, that 
they argued, is different from a regular recession. They found major deviations in 
output, private and public debt ratios and other macroeconomic and financial indicators 
of the Euro countries, when the model was estimated over pre- and post-crisis periods. 
Some of these deviations, such as persistent decline in investment, are atypical to the 
extent that they, as the authors argued, cannot be explained by the business cycle 
regularities. The crisis was also characterised by the record high fiscal deficit-GDP 
ratios followed by an adaptation of extremely tight fiscal policies, all of which make 
this crisis unprecedented and likely to cause a structural change in the macroeconomic 
indicators of some Euro countries. 
In studies that are more closely related to what we are doing Pesaran, Smith and 
Smith (2007) estimate what would have happened to the UK and Sweden and the euro 
area if the UK or Sweden had joined the euro using a Global Vector Autoregression, 
GVAR. Smith (2009) examines whether the establishment of the euro caused a 
structural break. In both cases there was a relatively short sample of data after the 
establishment of the euro and the samples ended prior to the financial crisis. In both 
cases the effects were not large. Now there is more data and the large shocks associated 
with the financial crisis provides extra identifying information. 
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3 Data 
We use data from the GVAR toolbox 1979Q3-2016Q4, Mohaddes and Raissi (2018), 
to estimate VARX* for a number of European countries that did or did not join the 
euro. 
For countries i=1,2,..,12 and t=1979Q2−2016Q4, the variables are: 
• 𝑦𝑖𝑖 natural logarithm of real GDP volume index 
• ∆𝑝𝑖𝑖  the rate of inflation, calculated by taking the difference of the natural 
logarithm of the consumer price index 
• 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖  natural logarithm of the nominal equity price index deflated by CPI 
• 𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑖 natural logarithm of the exchange rate of country i at time t expressed in 
units of foreign currency per US dollar deflated by country i’s CPI. We will 
refer to this as a real exchange rate, even though it is not adjusted for the US 
price level. 
• 𝑟𝑖𝑖  nominal short-term interest rate per quarter, in per cent; computed as 0.25 × ln(1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑟 ) /100 where 𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑟  is the nominal short rate of interest per 
annum in percent. 
• 𝑙𝑖𝑖 nominal long-term interest rate per quarter, in per cent; computed as 0.25 × ln�1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑟� /100 where 𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑟  is the nominal long rate of interest per 
annum in percent. 
• 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑖  natural logarithm of the nominal price of oil in US dollars  
The euro-member countries we consider are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain. The non-euro members are: Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, UK. The long interest rate is not available for Finland. 
In addition to individual variables, say 𝑥𝑖𝑖 , there are global equivalents 𝑥𝑖𝑖∗  
calculated as country specific trade weighted averages of the corresponding variables 
of the other countries  
 
𝑥𝑖𝑖
∗ = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑁𝑗=0 , with 𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 0, 
 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑗  is the share of country j in the trade (exports plus imports) of country i. So 
for instance if 𝑦𝑖𝑖 is log real GDP, 𝑦𝑖𝑖∗  is the weighted average of the log GDP of 
trading partners. 
For each country, we break the data into three periods. 1:1979Q4-1998Q4; 
2:1999Q1-2008Q4; 3: 2009Q1-2016Q4. Table 1 provides means and standard 
deviations for the growth rate, the rate of inflation, the change in the real exchange rate, 
and the long rate (excluding Finland). 
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Table 1: Mean and standard deviation, percent per annum (x400) 
 Dy   Dp   Dep   Lr   
 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Austria 2.28 2.00 1.08 3.14 1.99 1.70 -3.70 -2.28 0.93 7.19 4.10 2.15 
 3.66 3.58 4.26 2.08 1.14 1.25 20.34 20.86 15.91 1.51 0.49 1.22 
Belgium 1.94 1.91 1.14 3.49 2.23 1.55 -2.56 -2.51 1.07 8.72 4.38 2.47 
 3.23 2.79 2.32 2.67 1.73 1.69 20.41 20.64 15.76 2.32 0.64 1.33 
Finland 2.51 2.63 0.09 4.66 1.90 1.18 -3.13 -2.20 1.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 5.65 4.42 6.01 3.55 1.60 1.71 20.63 20.62 15.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 
France 1.84 1.82 0.77 4.52 1.77 0.92 -3.01 -2.05 1.70 9.20 4.32 2.20 
 1.78 2.32 1.82 4.04 1.19 1.14 19.38 20.85 15.77 2.85 0.61 1.11 
Germany 1.89 1.35 1.32 2.74 1.62 1.12 -3.10 -1.91 1.51 6.88 4.11 1.65 
 3.78 2.67 3.79 2.18 1.17 1.03 20.21 20.74 15.79 1.43 0.46 1.07 
Italy 1.89 0.97 -0.38 7.50 2.33 1.12 -3.79 -2.62 1.51 11.72 4.48 3.63 
 2.65 2.31 3.12 5.50 0.83 1.37 20.11 20.74 15.72 3.66 0.49 1.46 
Netherlands 2.31 1.90 0.45 2.68 2.18 1.44 -2.92 -2.48 1.19 7.42 4.35 1.97 
 3.26 2.43 2.83 2.14 1.25 1.42 20.27 20.46 15.81 1.56 0.66 1.13 
Norway 3.21 2.05 1.43 5.30 2.15 1.99 -3.12 -3.06 0.60 9.55 4.76 1.94 
 5.33 3.78 5.17 3.71 3.17 2.05 18.06 22.40 18.05 2.69 1.11 0.85 
Spain 2.51 2.82 0.43 6.99 3.12 0.66 -2.99 -3.41 1.96 11.54 4.17 3.66 
 1.88 2.20 2.48 4.07 1.67 3.28 20.00 21.11 16.11 3.15 0.61 1.54 
Sweden 1.91 2.30 2.63 5.51 1.61 0.65 -2.08 -1.89 1.17 10.10 4.40 1.91 
 5.64 4.50 4.11 4.37 1.63 1.52 21.21 21.98 19.38 2.12 0.71 0.97 
Switzerland 1.64 1.82 1.36 2.78 1.09 -0.30 -3.61 -3.04 -1.26 4.62 2.88 0.87 
 2.82 3.94 2.79 2.33 1.12 1.13 22.94 16.45 15.47 0.90 0.44 0.83 
UK 2.21 2.02 1.36 5.37 2.28 2.08 -3.80 -1.51 0.74 9.39 4.59 2.52 
 2.86 2.86 2.01 3.74 1.31 1.68 21.36 17.42 16.13 2.10 0.24 0.85 
Notes: Dy is the GDP growth rate, Dp is the rate of inflation, Dep is the change in the exchange 
rate, Lr is the long interest rate. The information are given for periods: 1: 1979Q4-1998Q4; 2: 
1999Q1-2008Q4; 3: 2009Q1-2016Q4. 
In the three year period after 1999 most of the countries suffered from lower 
growth, compared to the pre-euro period. The exceptions were Finland, Spain, Sweden, 
and Switzerland, who enjoyed a minor increase in the GDP growth rate. Moreover, 
growth is lower in the post crisis period, but this is a global phenomenon not just for 
euro countries. We control for this by including global variables 𝑥𝑖𝑖∗  in our model. 
The average inflation rate dropped during the period of euro formation. For most 
countries the inflation rate more than halved and in some cases, such as Italy it fell by 
more than two thirds. As for the euro countries, under the EMU, money supply and 
inflation were now closely coordinated by the the European Central Bank, ECB. 
However, it does not explain the decrease in inflation rates in the stand-alone countries. 
The inflation rate was maintained at a relatively stable rate after the financial crisis. 
The average exchange rate growth over the first two sub-periods was negative, 
suggesting appreciation against US dollar. However, following the financial crisis, the 
dollar strengthened against national currencies of the countries in the sample. The long 
interest rate declined significantly during the years of euro formation, partially as a 
result of the strict anti-inflationary policy adopted by the ECB, and fell further in the 
third period, possibly due to low expected inflation and returns on investments. 
Average growth rates fell over the three periods both for the 8 euro countries: 2.15, to 
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1.92, 0.62, and for the 4 non-euro countries: 2.24, 2.05, 1.69.  While the non-euro 
average is higher The differences are quite small for the first two periods, but in the 
post crisis period the four euro countries grew faster than any of the eight euro 
countries. Inflation fell over the three periods in both groups. 
 
4 Single Equation Model 
In the comparisons of growth rates in the descriptive statistics above we did not 
control for other factors, particularly the crisis, we now do that. To begin we estimate a 
simple single equation model that makes the log of real GDP an ARDL function of 
foreign GDP and trend over the pre-euro period 1979Q2-1998Q4, say 𝑡 = 1,2, … ,𝑇1:  
 
𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑦𝑖,𝑖−1 + 𝛽0𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ + 𝛽1𝑦𝑖 ,𝑖−1∗ + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 (1) 
 
This equation is then used to forecast GDP over the following 𝑇2  quarters, 
𝑡 = 𝑇1 + 1,𝑇1 + 2,… ,𝑇, with 𝑇2 = 𝑇 − 𝑇1. The counterfactual here is the value of 
output that would be predicted from pre 1999 parameters using post 1999 information 
on foreign variables.  
We use a number of tests for structural stability. Chow’s first test is for equality of 
the k=5 parameters between the two periods, assuming the variances are the same. It 
uses the unrestricted residual sum of squares of the regressions over the two periods 
(𝑢�1′𝑢�1 + 𝑢�2′𝑢�2) with degrees of freedom T−2k and restricted residual sum of squares 
from the regression over the whole period 𝑢�′𝑢�  with degrees of freedom T−k. The null 
hypothesis that the parameters are equal in the two periods implies k restrictions and 
the test statistic is  
 [𝑢�′𝑢� − (𝑢�1′𝑢�1 + 𝑢�2′𝑢�2)] 𝑘⁄(𝑢�1′𝑢�1 + 𝑢�2′𝑢�2) (𝑇 − 2𝑘)⁄ ~𝐹(𝑘,𝑇 − 2𝑘) 
 
Chow also suggested a second predictive failure test for the hypothesis that the first 
period predicts the second where the test statistic is:  
 [𝑢�′𝑢� − 𝑢�1′𝑢�1] 𝑇2⁄
𝑢�1′𝑢�1 (𝑇1 − 2𝑘)⁄ ~𝐹(𝑇2,𝑇1 − 𝑘) 
 
This tests the hypothesis that in  
 
�
𝑦1
𝑦2
� = �𝑋1 0𝑋2 𝐼� �𝛽1𝛿 � + �𝑢10 � 
 
δ, the T1×1 vector of forecast errors, are not significantly different from zero. This has 
a dummy variable for each observation in the second period. 
Table 2 gives the Chow Predictive Failure, PF, and Structural Stability, SS, tests 
p-values, mean and root mean square prediction errors for a break in 1999Q1. Plots of 
actual and predicted values are given in an appendix. These Chow tests assume a 
known break-point, but there are also Quandt-Andrews tests for an unknown break 
point, which searches over the possible dates for a single break. The trimming 
percentage is set to 15%. Table 2 also gives the Q-A break date, all are significant. 
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For Austria the predicted is close to the actual with a small mean error and RMSPE. 
Neither the PF nor SS test rejects the hypothesis of structural stability at the 5% level. 
The countries which performed less well than expected from the pre-euro 
relationship are Italy, Netherlands, and Norway. Their mean errors and RMSPEs are on 
a higher end, comparing to the rest of the sample. Moreover, the Chow SS test statistics 
suggests possible structural instability in growth rates of Italy and Norway at 5% level 
and that of Netherlands at 10% level. 
 
Table 2: Structural Break in 1999Q1: log GDP 
 PF SS Mean PE RMSPE Q-A Test 
 F(72, 72) F(5, 139)    
Austria 0.49 0.05 0.01 0.02 1988Q3*** 
Belgium 1.00 0.00 0.05 0.06 1987Q3*** 
Finland 0.99 0.08 0.10 0.11 1990Q2*** 
France 0.94 0.00 0.04 0.04 1998Q2*** 
Germany 1.00 0.04 0.00 0.08 1988Q3*** 
Italy 0.99 0.00 -0.07 0.09 2003Q1*** 
Netherlands 1.00 0.09 -0.06 0.08 1986Q1*** 
Norway* 0.91 0.03 -0.11 0.15 1987Q3*** 
Spain 0.14 0.02 -0.09 0.15 2008Q2*** 
Sweden* 1.00 0.02 0.15 0.17 1990Q1*** 
Switzerland* 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.16 2008Q2*** 
UK* 0.68 0.00 -0.59 0.83 2008Q2*** 
Notes: PF: Chow Predictive failure test; SS: Chow Structural stability test; Mean PE: 
Mean Prediction Errors; RMSPE: Root Mean Squared Prediction Error; Q-A Test: 
Quandt-Andrews Test (*** indicates a significance level of 1 percent, ** of 5 percent, 
and * of 10 percent); *: non-member countries. 
 
The countries which performed better than expected from the pre-euro relationship 
are Belgium, Finland, France, Sweden, and Switzerland. Chow SS test suggests 
presence of structural instability in time series of all these countries, except Finland. In 
case of Switzerland this conclusion is supported by the Chow PF statistics as well. 
Sweden and Switzerland have the highest mean prediction errors and RMSPE in the 
sample, excluding the UK. The UK results are unreliable because the coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable was greater than one on the pre-euro period. 
The countries where the evidence is mixed are Germany and Spain. For Germany 
the predicted growth rate was higher than the actual one and was expected to decline 
around 2011. However, contrary to this prediction, ever since a sharp drop during the 
global crisis 2007-08, the actual growth rate has been slowly increasing. For Spain the 
actual was close to the predicted till the global crisis, after which the actual growth rate 
dropped below the predicted one and continued to increase at a much slower pace than 
was predicted. 
Overall, for majority of countries in the sample their actual and predicted growth 
rates are not necessarily close to each other, but exhibit similar general patters. Only in 
case of Spain, Germany, Switzerland, and the UK the actual and predicted income 
growth rates diverge substantially from each other. 
In Finland the break occurred in early 1990s (1990Q2), time of Finnish banking 
crisis and collapse of the Soviet Union, with which Finland had strong trading ties. In 
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case of Sweden the Q-A test identified a break in 1990Q1, which might be connected to 
the Swedish banking crisis that erupted in 1992. For Spain, Switzerland, and the UK, 
the Q-A test statistics suggests a breakpoint in 2008Q2, year of the global financial 
crisis. As for the rest of the countries, the identified breakpoints are not characterised 
by any major economic or financial events. 
The Bai-Perron test which allows for multiple breakpoints was also used, but did 
not suggest that Euro formation was a reason behind the breaks in the data for any of 
the countries in the sample. 
We also estimate a growth rate relationship below: 
 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼0′ + 𝛼1′∆𝑦𝑖,𝑖−1 + 𝛽0′∆𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ + 𝛽1′∆𝑦𝑖 ,𝑖−1∗ + 𝜖𝑖 (2) 
 
where ∆𝑦𝑖𝑖  and ∆𝑦𝑖𝑖∗  are real domestic and foreign GDP growth rates, respectively, 
and 𝜖 is the error term. 
This equation is then used to forecast GDP growth rate as with the levels 
relationship over the following 𝑇2 quarters, 𝑡 = 𝑇1 + 1,𝑇1 + 2,… ,𝑇, with 𝑇2 = 𝑇 −
𝑇1.  
Compared to the levels relationship, the results for the growth equation are quite 
different. In Austria and Belgium overall foreign income growth effect is positive, but 
the lagged foreign GDP is only significant at 5% level in Belgium and insignificant in 
Austria. In addition, coefficient of the lagged national income is negative and in case of 
Belgium, insignificant. The equations, however, passed all the diagnostic tests, except 
the Belgium equation, which failed the serial correlation test at 10% level. 
In case of Finland, France, Germany, Italy, and Netherlands only the foreign 
income growth coefficient is significant and positive. The equation for France passed 
all the diagnostic tests, while the ones for Finland and Germany failed serial correlation 
test. As for Italy, the equation failed serial correlation and normality tests. The equation 
for Netherlands failed normality and functional form tests, the latter only at 10% level. 
In the Norway equation foreign income growth has significant positive effect on 
home GDP growth. However, lagged domestic income growth has negative and 
significant effect on the dependent variable. This equation passed all the diagnostic 
tests. 
In case of Spain lagged domestic income growth and foreign income growth have 
positive effect on domestic GDP growth, but the foreign coefficient is only significant 
at 10% level. However, the equation failed serial correlation test and normality test, the 
latter only at 10% level. In Sweden, both foreign income growth and lagged domestic 
GDP growth coefficients are significant, although the former is positive, while the 
latter is negative. The equation passed all the diagnostic tests. In case of Switzerland 
and the UK, the foreign income growth and lagged domestic income growth have 
positive and significant effect on the dependent variable and the Switzerland equation 
passed all the diagnostic tests, while the UK one failed those for serial correlation at 5% 
level, as well as functional form and normality at 10% level. 
The lagged foreign income is insignificant in all countries equations with exception 
of Belgium where it is significant at 10% level. Nonetheless, comparing to the levels 
specification model, the lagged foreign income growth coefficient is positive in all 
equations, except Finland, France, and Norway, with overall foreign income growth 
effect being positive for all countries. All equations passed functional form test 
(Netherlands and the UK failed it, but only at 10% level) and heteroskedasticity test, 
however Belgium (at 10% level), Finland, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK failed the 
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serial correlation test and four failed the normality test (Italy and Netherlands at 5%, 
while Spain and the UK at 10% level). 
 
Table 3: Structural Break Analysis (Income Growth) 
 PF SS Mean PE RMSPE Q-A Test 
 F(72,73) F(4,141) Annual % Annual %  
Austria 0.49 0.75 -0.28 3.22 1988Q2 
Belgium 1.00 0.59 0.35 1.76 1986Q3** 
Finland 1.00 0.05 -0.62 3.89 1988Q1*** 
France 0.94 0.34 -0.20 1.35 2001Q4 
Germany 1.00 0.88 0.09 1.89 1988Q3* 
Italy 1.00 0.01 -1.17 1.88 2003Q1*** 
Netherlands 1.00 0.14 -0.64 1.85 1986Q1** 
Norway* 0.94 0.31 -1.27 4.36 1986Q2* 
Spain 0.00 0.12 -0.59 2.14 2000Q2 
Sweden* 0.99 0.03 1.22 3.30 1994Q2** 
Switzerland* 0.06 0.08 0.62 2.95 2008Q4 
UK* 1.00 0.69 -0.18 1.84 1986Q1 
Notes: PF: Chow Predictive failure test; SS: Chow Structural stability test; Mean PE: 
Mean Prediction Errors; RMSPE: Root Mean Squared Prediction Error; Q-A Test: 
Quandt-Andrews Test (*** indicates a significance level of 1 percent, ** of 5 percent, 
and * of 10 percent); *: non-member countries. 
 
Moving to the structural stability analysis, similarly to the levels equations, Table 3 
summarises the p-values for the PF and SS tests, mean errors and RMSPE for a break in 
1999Q1, as well as Q-A test breakpoints. Plots of actual and predicted values are given 
in an appendix. 
For Germany the predicted is closest to the actual with the smallest mean prediction 
error in a sample, 0.09%. However, RMSPE is the smallest for France, 1.35% and its 
mean PE is also relatively small, -0.20%, suggesting that the country performed 
slightly worse than expected from the pre-euro relationship. In both cases, Germany 
and France, neither the PF nor SS test rejects the hypothesis of structural stability. 
However, Q-A test identified potential breakpoint for Germany in 1988Q3, but it is 
only significant at 10% level. 
Similarly to France, the UK and Austria also performed a bit worse than expected, 
with the mean PE of -0.18% and -0.28%, respectively. The tests do not indicate either 
parameter instability or predictive failure. Spain, Finland, Netherlands, Italy, and 
Norway performed even less well with their negative mean errors and RMSPEs are on 
a higher end, comparing to the rest of the sample. Furthermore, in case of Spain both, 
Chow PF and SS tests, suggest possible structural instability. In Italy and Finland there 
is indication of parameter change, but not predictive failure (in case of Finland, at 10% 
level only). The Q-A test suggest a breakpoint in 1988Q1 in Finland and in 2003Q1 in 
Italy and in 1986Q1 in the Netherlands, as well as, in 1986Q2 in Norway (only 
significant at 10% level). 
Moving to the countries which performed better than expected from the pre-euro 
relationship are Belgium, Switzerland, and most of all Sweden with the highest mean 
PE of 1.22% in the sample. While Chow PF and SS tests find no signs of structural 
instability in Belgium time series, the Q-A test suggest a possible breakpoint in 
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1986Q3. Both tests, Chow PF and SS, reject the null hypothesis of structural stability 
for Switzerland, but only at 10% level and the Q-A finds no structural breaks in this 
time series. Finally, Chow SS suggests structural instability in case of Sweden and the 
Q-A finds a break in 1994Q2. 
Comparing the growth rate and levels relationship estimations, the Q-A test results 
are similar in case of Belgium and Norway, but very different for the Netherlands and 
Sweden. Interestingly the Q-A test does not identify a structural break around 
1998-1999, third stage for the implementation of the EMU, neither when the 
relationship estimated in levels nor in first differences. However, for level models the 
Q-A finds significant breakpoints in all countries, while in growth rate models only in 
seven, even including breakpoints that are significant at 10% only. 
Furthermore, if in the levels relationships the SS test suggested structural instability 
in all countries (three of them, Austria, Finland and the Netherlands, are only 
significant at 10% level), in the growth rate estimations it rejects the null only in four 
countries (in Finland and Switzerland only at 10% level). Overall, it appears the growth 
rate form fits the data better. 
To consider how interest rate determination changed with the formation of the euro 
and the crisis, Taylor Rules were estimated for the pre-euro period, 1979Q4-1998Q4; 
the early pre-crisis euro period, 1999Q1-2008Q4; and the post crisis period 
2009Q1-2016Q4. The estimated equation for each country made the short interest rate 
for each country, 𝑟𝑖 a function of its lagged value, the lagged rate of inflation, 𝜋𝑖−1, 
and the lagged log output gap, 𝑦𝑖−1 − 𝑦𝑖−1∗ . This takes the form 
 
𝑟𝑖 = (1 − 𝜆)𝑟𝑖−1 + 𝜆 �𝜃∗ + 𝜃𝜋𝜋𝑖−1 + 𝜃𝑦(𝑦𝑖−1 − 𝑦𝑖−1∗ )�+ 𝑢𝑖 
 
Potential log output is approximated by a linear trend, so the estimated equation 
takes the form  
 
𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑟𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝜋𝜋𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝑦𝑦𝑖−1 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 (3) 
 
In the pre-euro period both 𝛽𝑦 > 0 in every country and significant in all but three, 
while 𝛽𝜋 > 0  in 10, significantly so in 3 and insignificantly negative in the 
Netherlands and Spain. The average value of 𝜃𝜋 was 0.17 with a standard deviation of 
0.26, ranging from -0.53 in the Netherlands to 0.47 in Belgium. The average value of 
𝜃𝑦 was 0.15 with a standard deviation of 0.07, ranging from 0.06 in Sweden to 0.29 in 
the Netherlands In the second, early euro period 5 countries show negative 𝛽𝜋 
coefficients (Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands and UK), none significantly negative, 
only Finland and Austria are significantly positive. 𝛽𝑦 was significantly positive in all 
countries except Switzerland. The results for the third post-crisis period are subject to 
the fact that interest rates moved relatively little over this period. There are two 
negative 𝛽𝜋 , Switzerland and the UK, neither significantly so, and 3 significantly 
positive Sweden, Italy, and Austria. There are now six negative 𝛽𝑦 , Belgium, 
Netherlands, Norway (significant), Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and only the UK one 
is significantly positive.  
For most countries the match between actual and predicted is fairly close until the 
crisis when the predicted interest rate falls sharply and the actual interest rate 
constrained by the zero lower bound cannot follow. With the exception of Sweden and 
Switzerland, predicted interest rates go sharply negative at the end of the sample, being 
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below the actual. In Sweden and Switzerland, predicted is above actual for the whole 
period. In Germany the predicted is below the actual for the whole period. In Italy and 
Netherlands the predicted is below the actual from about 2002. The hypothesis of 
structural stability, no change in the parameters before and after the establishment of 
the euro is not rejected in Finland, Norway, Spain and Switzerland. Though the test is 
conditional on equality of variances, which is unlikely to be the case here. The standard 
error of regression for the pre-euro period is large relative to that for the two post euro 
periods. 
There is little in these results that would suggest a big difference between the euro 
members and non-members in this group. 
We proceed by estimating Taylor Rules using long-run interest rates with the 
estimated equation taking the following form:  
 
𝑙𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑟𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝜋𝜋𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝑦𝑦𝑖−1 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 (4) 
 
where 𝑙𝑟𝑖  is a nominal long-term interest rate per quarter. 
Our sample is one country short, because the long-term interest rate data is not 
available for Finland. 
In the pre-euro period 𝛽𝑦 is positive in every country and significant in all but four. 
The average value of 𝜃𝑦 was 0.11 with a standard deviation of 0.13, ranging from 0.02 
in the UK to 0.49 in Italy. As for inflation coefficients, 𝛽𝜋 is positive in all but one 
country, significantly so in three and insignificantly negative in Norway. The average 
value of 𝜃𝜋 was 0.20 with a standard deviation of 0.30. The coefficients of 𝜃𝜋 ranged 
from -0.11 in the Norway, to almost unity (0.97) in Italy. In the second period 𝛽𝜋 is 
negative for all countries except Germany, Italy, and Sweden, but none are significant. 
In contrast, 𝛽𝑦 was positive for all countries, but significantly so only for Austria, 
Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway. As for the post-crisis period, 𝛽𝜋 was positive 
for all countries except Norway, Switzerland, and the UK, but was insignificant for the 
whole sample. Moreover, 𝛽𝑦 is now insignificant for all countries and is negative for 
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. 
As before, the results do not vary substantially between euro and non-euro 
members. The differences between actual and predicted are smaller for all countries 
when Taylor Rules are estimated using long-term interest rates instead of short-term 
ones. 
 
5 Systems approach 
5.1 Theoretical model 
Although we are not going to use a structural model, we will set out how our 
estimated model relates to a fully specified structural model. Consider the following 
rational expectations (RE) model for a small open economy in the 𝑘 × 1 vector 𝒙𝑖 of 
endogenous variables, determined in terms of their expected future values, past values, 
a 𝑘∗ × 1  vector of corresponding foreign variables, 𝒙𝑖∗  which are treated as 
exogenous, and a 𝑘𝑑 × 1 vector of deterministic elements like trend and intercept:  
 
𝑨0(𝜑)𝒙𝑖 = 𝑨1(𝜑)𝐸𝑖(𝒙𝑖+1) + 𝑨2(𝜑)𝒙𝑖−1 + 𝑨3(𝜑)𝒙𝑖∗ + 𝑨4(𝜑)𝒅𝑖 + 𝒖𝑖 (5) 
 
13 
For the expected future values, 𝐸𝑖(𝒙𝑖+1) = 𝐸𝑖(𝒙𝑖+1|ℐ𝑖), the information set is 
ℐ𝑖 = (𝒙𝑖 ,𝒙𝑖−1, … ;𝒙𝑖∗,𝒙𝑖−1∗ , … ). 𝑨𝑖(𝜑) are matrices of coefficients. For i=0,1,2, they 
are of dimension k×k, for i=3 dimension 𝑘 × 𝑘∗, for i=4, dimension 𝑘 × 𝑘𝑑. 𝑨0(𝜑) is 
non-singular, 𝜑 is a vector of deep parameters, and 𝒖𝑖 is a k×1 vector of structural 
shocks. The exogenous variables are assumed to follow the VAR(1) model  
 
𝒙𝑖
∗ = 𝒂(𝜌) + 𝑹(𝜌)𝒙𝑖−1∗ + 𝜼𝑖 (6) 
 
where 𝒂(𝜌)  is a 𝑘𝑥 × 1  vector of intercepts and 𝑹(𝜌)  is the 𝑘𝑥 × 𝑘𝑥  matrix of 
coefficients that depend on a vector of unknown coefficients, 𝜌. This marginal model 
is required because forecasts of 𝒙𝑖∗  are required to construct the expectations 
𝐸𝑖(𝒙𝑖+1). The errors, 𝒖𝑖  and 𝜼𝑖  are assumed to be serially and cross sectionally 
uncorrelated, with zero means and constant variances, 𝚺𝑢, and 𝚺𝜂, respectively. 
If the quadratic matrix equation,  
 
𝑨1(𝜑)𝚽2(𝜑) − 𝑨0(𝜑)𝚽(𝜑) + 𝑨2(𝜑) = 𝟎 
 
has a solution, 𝚽(𝜑), with all its eigenvalues inside the unit circle, then, the RE model, 
(5) and (6), has the unique solution1 
 
𝒙𝑖 = 𝚽(𝜑)𝒙𝑖−1 +𝚿(𝜑,𝜌)𝒙𝑖∗ + 𝝁𝑎(𝜑,𝜌)𝒅𝑖 + 𝚪(𝜑)𝒖𝑖 (7) 
 
The variance matrix of the reduced form shocks, 𝜀𝑖 = 𝚪(𝜑)𝒖𝑖 is  
 
𝚺𝜀(𝜑) = 𝐸(𝜀𝑖′𝜀𝑖) = 𝚪(𝜑)𝚺𝑢𝚪′(𝜑) 
 
Equation (7) is labelled a VARX* in the GVAR literature. It corresponds to the 
reduced form of a standard simultaneous equations model, when 𝑨1(𝜑) = 0 and there 
are no forward looking terms. It corresponds to a vector autoregression when there are 
no exogenous variables, so 𝑨3(𝜑) = 𝚿(𝜑,𝜌) = 0. What is relevant for the case of the 
euro is that the parameters of (7) may change either because the parameters of the 
process generating the endogenous variables, 𝜑 , change say from 𝜑1  to 𝜑2 , or 
because the parameters of the process generating the exogenous variables, 𝜌, changes 
from 𝜌1  to 𝜌2 . Changes in the process driving the exogenous variables could be 
important because they may change how people form their expectations, 𝐸𝑖(𝒙𝑖+1). 
 
5.2 VARX* 
The VARX* (7) was for a single country, now consider a set of countries 
i=0,1,2,...,N, with country 0, say the US, as the numeraire country: we use the exchange 
rate against the dollar. Suppressing the dependence on the deep parameters, a 
second-order country-specific VARX*(2,2) model with deterministic trends can be 
written as  
 
𝒙𝑖𝑖 = 𝑩𝑖𝑑𝒅𝑖 + 𝑩𝑖1𝒙𝑖,𝑖−1 + 𝑩𝑖2𝒙𝑖,𝑖−2 + 𝑩𝑖0∗ 𝒙𝑖𝑖∗ + 𝑩𝑖1∗ 𝒙𝑖,𝑖−1∗ + 𝑩𝑖2∗ 𝒙𝑖,𝑖−2∗ + 𝒖𝑖𝑖 (8) 
 
                                                          
1 See, for instance, Pesaran (2015, ch. 20). 
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where 𝒙𝑖𝑖  is a 𝑘1 × 1 (usually six) vector of domestic variables, 𝒙𝑖𝑖∗  is a 𝑘𝑖∗ × 1 
vector of foreign variables specific to country i, and 𝒅𝑖  is a 𝑠 × 1  vector of 
deterministic elements as well as observed common variables, oil prices in our case: (1, 𝑡, 𝑝𝑖𝑜). The 𝒙𝑖𝑖∗  are calculated as country specific trade weighted averages of the 
corresponding variables of the other countries  
 
𝒙𝑖𝑖
∗ = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝒙𝑗𝑖𝑁𝑗=0 , with 𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 0, 
 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑗  is the share of country j in the trade (exports plus imports) of country i. 
In the case of small open economies it is reasonable to assume that the 𝒙𝑖𝑖∗  are 
“long run forcing” or I(1) weakly exogenous, and then estimate the VARX* models 
separately for each country, allowing for cointegration both within 𝒙𝑖𝑖 and across 𝒙𝑖𝑖 
and 𝒙𝑖𝑖∗ .
2 Tests for the weak exogeneity of 𝒙𝑖𝑖∗  generally do not reject the hypothesis. 
The 𝒙𝑖𝑖∗  would typically refer to the same variables as 𝒙𝑖𝑖, thus there is a symmetric 
structure to the model. 
The cointegrating VARX* can be written as a VECM  
 
∆𝒙𝑖𝑖 = 𝑩𝑖𝑑𝒅𝑖 + 𝚷𝑖𝒛𝑖,𝑖−1 + 𝑩𝑖0∗ ∆𝒙𝑖𝑖∗ + 𝚪𝑖∆𝒛𝑖,𝑖−1 + 𝒖𝑖𝑖 (9) 
 
where 𝒛𝑖,𝑖 = (𝒙𝑖𝑖′ ,𝒙𝑖𝑖∗′)′ . Restricting the deterministic terms and assuming that 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑘(𝚷𝑖) = 𝑟𝑖 < 𝑘𝑖 + 𝑘𝑖∗ , we have 𝚷𝑖 = α𝑖β𝑖′ , where β𝑖  is the (𝑘𝑖 + 𝑘𝑖∗) × 𝑟𝑖 
matrix of the cointegrating coefficients and 
 
∆𝒙𝑖𝑖 = α𝑖β𝑖′�𝒛𝑖,𝑖−1 − 𝚼𝑖𝒅𝑖−1�+ 𝑩𝑖0∗ ∆𝒙𝑖𝑖∗ + 𝚪𝑖∆𝒛𝑖,𝑖−1 + 𝚷𝑖𝚼𝑖∆𝒅𝑖 + 𝒖𝑖𝑖 (10) 
 
The 𝑟𝑖 error correction terms of the model can now be written as 
 
𝜉𝑖𝑖 = β𝑖′𝒛𝑖,𝑖−β𝑖′𝚼𝑖𝒅𝑖 = β𝑖𝑥′𝒙𝑖𝑖 + β𝑖𝑥∗′𝒙𝑖𝑖∗ + γ𝑖′𝒅𝑖 
 
The 𝜉𝑖𝑖  are mean zero 𝑟𝑖 ×1 vectors of disequilibrium deviations from the long run 
relationships. Forecasts and counter-factuals are invariant to the just-identifying 
restrictions used to identify β𝑖′. To establish whether there are changes in the reduced 
form parameters, we do not need to identify either the structural shocks or the 
cointegrating vectors.  
Notice that if 𝑟𝑖 = 0 in (10), this gives a first difference model and if 𝑟𝑖 = 𝑘 this 
gives an unrestricted levels VARX* (8). 
 
5.3 Model Selection 
We wish to examine whether there was a break at time 𝑇0, the end of 1998Q4. To 
do this, we estimate (10) using the whole sample: 1979Q4-2016Q4, which we call 
period 0; then for period 1 (1979Q4-1998Q4) and period 2 (1999Q1-2016Q4) and 
examine the extent to which allowing for a structural break improves the fit. In 
estimating (10), for each country we have to (a) choose lag-length for endogenous and 
                                                          
2 This is unlikely to apply to a large economy like the US which may influence 
world interest rates. But it seems reasonable for the European countries we 
consider. 
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exogenous variables, (𝑝𝑒𝑖 , 𝑝𝑥𝑖), which are set to a maximum of (2,2), (b) choose the 
number of cointegrating vectors 𝑟𝑖  and (c) judge the significance of any structural 
breaks. Although there are tests for each of these, some of which are non-standard, it 
seems better to make the choices for the various elements within a consistent 
framework. This can be done using information criteria, IC.  
If model i has 𝑘𝑖 estimated parameters and maximised log likelihood 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖 the 
Akaike information criterion is 𝐴𝐼𝐴𝑖 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖 − 𝑘𝑖 . The Schwarz Bayesian 
information criterion is 𝐵𝐼𝐴𝑖 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖 − 0.4 × 𝑘𝑖 × ln𝑇, where T is the sample size.3 
Two models are estimated, one using (𝑝𝑒𝑖𝐴 , 𝑝𝑥𝑖𝐴 ) and 𝑟𝑖𝐴 chosen on the basis of AIC 
and one using (𝑝𝑒𝑖𝐵 , 𝑝𝑥𝑖𝐵 )  and 𝑟𝑖𝐵  chosen on the basis of BIC. We use period 1, 
pre-euro, data to make the choice. 
In the case of nested models, which is what we will be concerned with, the 
information criteria can be interpreted as likelihood ratio tests. Suppose that the 
unrestricted model with 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈 has one more parameter than the restricted model with 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅. Then a standard likelihood ratio test with probability of type I error, α=5%, 
would choose the unrestricted model if 𝑀𝑅 = 2(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈 − 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅) > 3.84. The AIC 
would choose the unrestricted model if 2(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈 −𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅) > 2 , corresponding to 
roughly to α=15%. The BIC would choose the unrestricted model if 2(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈 −
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅) > ln𝑇, which for T=100 is 4.6, which corresponds to roughly α=3%. The AIC 
and LR keep α constant and use any extra information to increase the power. They will 
reject any deviation from the null, however small, for a sufficiently large sample size. 
The BIC reduces α with the sample size, so the probabilities of both type I and type II 
errors fall with sample size. The BIC is consistent in that it will choose the true model 
as the sample size gets large, if the true model is in the set being considered. If the true 
model is not in the set being considered the AIC, including more parameters may 
provide a better approximation to it. By using both we can judge how robust our results 
are to possible over-fitting or under-fitting. 
We will use the difference between the sum of the IC for periods 1 and 2 and the IC 
for the whole period as an indication of the extent of the structural break. For the AIC, 
the difference is 𝐷𝐴 = 𝐴𝐼𝐴1 + 𝐴𝐼𝐴2 − 𝐴𝐼𝐴0  and 2𝐷𝐴 = 𝑀𝑅 − 𝐾 , where K is the 
number of parameters. So the AIC choice corresponds to an LR test with a critical 
value of K. Similarly, 𝐷𝐵 = 𝐵𝐼𝐴1 + 𝐵𝐼𝐴2 − 𝐵𝐼𝐴0, which corresponds to an LR test 
with a critical value of K ( ln𝑇1 + ln𝑇2 − ln𝑇 ). The dimensions are 𝑇1 = 77 , 
𝑇2 = 72, T=149, and with (𝑝𝑒𝑖 , 𝑝𝑥𝑖) = (2,2) and 𝑟𝑖 = 6 there are 25 parameters in 
each equation. 
 
5.4 Conditioning 
In order to identify where the structural changes originate, we will condition on 
some elements of 𝒙𝑖𝑖, say 𝒙2,𝑖𝑖, in particular interest rates and exchange rates, and treat 
them as exogenous, in explaining 𝒙1,𝑖𝑖 . The interpretation of this process follows 
Pesaran & Smith (1998). For clarity of exposition we abstract from the country 
identifier, i, the deterministic terms dt and the other exogenous foreign variables, 𝒙𝑖𝑖
∗ . 
Then (9) can be written as:  
 
∆𝒙𝑖 = 𝚷𝒙𝑖−1 + 𝚪∆𝒙𝑖−1 + 𝒖𝑖 (11) 
 
                                                          
3 Some programs report -2 times these numbers. 
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We now partition 𝒙𝑖 = �𝒙1,𝑖′ ,𝒙2,𝑖′ �′ to give  
 
∆𝒙1𝑖 = 𝚷11𝒙1,𝑖−1 + 𝚷12𝒙2,𝑖−1 + 𝚪11∆𝒙1,𝑖−1 + 𝚪12∆𝒙2,𝑖−1 + 𝒖1𝑖 
 
∆𝒙2𝑖 = 𝚷21𝒙1,𝑖−1 + 𝚷22𝒙2,𝑖−1 + 𝚪21∆𝒙1,𝑖−1 + 𝚪22∆𝒙2,𝑖−1 + 𝒖2𝑖 
 
where the covariance matrix of the reduced form disturbances is given by:  
 
𝚺 = �𝚺11 𝚺12𝚺21 𝚺22� 
 
This partition does not impose any restrictions in itself, but provides a framework 
for examining how exogenous variables relate to the structure of the VAR.  
To condition 𝒙1𝑖  on current values of 𝒙2𝑖 , define 𝐸(𝒖1𝑖|𝒖2𝑖) = 𝚺12𝚺22−1𝒖2𝑖 =
𝚯𝒖2𝑖 with 𝒖1𝑖 = 𝚯𝒖2𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖. The system for 𝒙1𝑖, can then be written  
 
∆𝒙1𝑖 = (𝚷11 − 𝚯𝚷21)𝒙1,𝑖−1 + (𝚷12 − 𝚯𝚷22)𝒙2,𝑖−1 + 𝚯∆𝒙2,𝑖+ (𝚪11 − 𝚯𝚪21)∆𝒙1,𝑖−1 + (𝚪12 − 𝚯𝚪22)∆𝒙2,𝑖−1 + 𝜂𝑖 (12) 
∆𝒙1𝑖 = 𝑩1𝒙1,𝑖−1 + 𝑩2𝒙2,𝑖−1 + 𝑪20∆𝒙2,𝑖 + 𝑪21∆𝒙1,𝑖−1 + 𝑪22∆𝒙2,𝑖−1 + 𝜂𝑖 
 
By construction 𝐸(𝜂𝑖|Δ𝒙𝑖) = 𝟎, and the parameters of (12) can be estimated 
efficiently by OLS. Also denoting the (conditional) variance of 𝜂𝑖 by 𝚺𝜂𝜂 it is easily 
seen that  
 
𝚺𝜂𝜂 − 𝚺11 = −𝚺12𝚺22−1𝚺21 ≤ 𝟎 
 
The variance of 𝜂𝑖 will generally be smaller than that of 𝒖1𝑖, so the parameters in 
the conditional model, (12), are likely to be estimated more precisely than the 
parameters of the unconditional model (11). Whether this is an advantage depends on 
what the economic parameters of interest are. If the parameters of interest are 
𝚷 = (𝚷11,𝚷12), it is clear from equation (12) that ∆𝒙2,𝑖 will be weakly exogenous for 
𝚷11 only if either 𝚺12 = 𝟎, so that 𝚯 = 𝟎, or if 𝚷2 = (𝚷21,𝚷22) = 𝟎.4 In either of 
these cases the coefficient matrix on �𝒙1,𝑖−1,𝒙2,𝑖−1� in the conditional model (12) will 
provide an estimate of 𝚷, otherwise it will not. In other cases, the economic parameters 
of interest may be the long-run effects of 𝒙2,𝑖 on 𝒙1,𝑖 so one might be interested in (𝚷12 − 𝚯𝚷22) directly, in which case the model conditional on 𝒙𝑖  is appropriate 
whether or not 𝚷2 = 𝟎. 
For some purposes we are interested in the complete system but for other purposes 
we are interested in the responses to particular policy variables and how these 
                                                          
4 When the restrictions 𝚷2 = 𝟎 hold, 𝒙2𝑖 is referred to as “long-run forcing” for 
𝒙1𝑖. This is different from Granger non-causality, GNC. 𝒙2𝑖 is said to be GNC 
for 𝒙1𝑖 if 𝚷12 = 𝟎 and 𝚪12 = 𝟎; 𝒙2𝑖 does not predict 𝒙1𝑖. If 𝚷2 = 𝟎, 𝒙2𝑖 
cannot themselves be cointegrated. 
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responses changed with the introduction of the euro. In this case, the parameters of 
interest are the parameters of the conditional model, (12). Of particular interest is the 
case where the parameters of the marginal model, the process generating the policy 
variables, interest rates and exchange rates, changed, shifting 𝚷21, 𝚪22 and 𝚯,but the 
parameters of the conditional model, 𝐁𝑖, 𝐂𝑖𝑗, did not change.
5 
 
6 Systems Results 
The lag orders for the endogenous and exogenous variables (𝑝𝑒 , 𝑝𝑥)  and the 
number of cointegrating vectors r could be chosen from the pre-euro sample; the 
post-euro sample or the whole sample. We determined them on the basis of the 
pre-euro sample, since any subsequent change will appear as a structural break. Thus 
for each country we estimate a cointegrating VARX* for period 1: 1979Q4-1988Q4, 
and use the AIC to determine (𝑝𝑒𝑖𝐴 , 𝑝𝑥𝑖𝐴 ) and 𝑟𝑖𝐴 and the BIC to determine (𝑝𝑒𝑖𝐵 , 𝑝𝑥𝑖𝐵 ) 
and 𝑟𝑖𝐵. Using these values we estimate the AIC model and the BIC model for period 2: 
1999Q1-2016Q4 and for period 0, with no break: 1979Q4-2016Q4. This gives the 
results summarised in the Table 4.  
As one would expect the AIC model tends to have larger values of (𝑝𝑒𝑖 , 𝑝𝑥𝑖) and 
𝑟𝑖. In some cases such as Sweden, 𝑟𝑖𝐴 = 6, indicating that all the variables are I(0), 
while 𝑟𝑖𝐵 = 0, indicating that all the variables are I(1) and not cointegrated. The 
differences of AIC and BIC are all positive, indicating that the model with a break at 
the time of the euro formation is preferred. The differences are always smaller for the 
BIC than for the AIC because the BIC imposes a heavier penalty for the extra 
parameters in the break model. If we rank AIC by differences, the break seems smaller 
for the non-euro countries: Sweden had the 8th smallest difference, Norway 10th, UK 
11th and Switzerland 12th. Among the euro countries, Finland ranked 9th had the 
smallest difference. The ranking by BIC is similar, the difference in ranks is small 
except for Sweden which goes from 8th by AIC to 4th by BIC. The table indicates that 
there is evidence for a break and it seems larger in the euro countries than the non-euro 
countries. 
 
  
                                                          
5 As is clear from (7) the Lucas critique says that any change in the marginal model 
determining policy will change the conditional model. 
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Table 4: Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria for a euro structural break, m=6 
 Model r Order IC by Period Difference  
   e,x 0 1 2  Rank 
 
Austria 
A 5 1,1 3362.7 1799 1842.6 278.9 1 
 B 1 1,1 3238.5 1683 1727.3 171.8 1 
Belgium A 6 2,2 3377.8 1728.6 1866.4 217.2 6 
 B 1 1,1 3254.3 1625.6 1746.4 117.7 7 
Finland A 4 2,1 2240.2 1131.4 1256 147.2 9 
 B 0 1,1 2153.4 1054.6 1145.8 47 11 
France A 4 2,1 3524.1 1746.5 2024.3 246.7 3 
 B 0 1,1 3397.9 1655.3 1899.1 156.5 2 
Germany A 6 2,2 3508.3 1775.7 1956.5 223.9 4 
 B 3 1,1 3365.5 1658 1831.9 124.4 5 
Italy A 6 2,2 3182.2 1580.4 1800.7 198.9 7 
 B 1 1,1 3034.6 1460.4 1678.5 104.4 8 
Netherlands A 6 2,1 3547.7 1792.9 1975.4 220.6 5 
 B 1 1,1 3435.2 1698.8 1856.6 120.2 6 
Norway A 5 2,1 3041.2 1569.7 1615.6 144.1 10 
 B 2 1,1 2871.6 1451.8 1507.2 87.4 9 
Spain A 6 2,1 3141.1 1620.1 1770.2 249.2 2 
 B 1 1,1 2973.7 1474.7 1647.7 148.7 3 
Sweden A 6 2,1 3093.8 1507.1 1768.9 182.2 8 
 B 0 1,1 2948.8 1404.6 1670.3 126.1 4 
Switzerland A 4 2,1 3423.9 1765.5 1740.2 81.8 12 
 B 0 1,1 3294.3 1649.3 1660.2 15.2 12 
UK A 5 1,1 3409.9 1711.7 1839.1 140.9 11 
 B 2 1,1 3283.1 1596.6 1749.1 62.6 10 
Notes: Model A is chosen by AIC, Model B by BIC. r is the number of cointegrating 
vectors. e,x gives the lag orders on endogenous and exogenous variables. The 
information criteria are given for periods: 0: 1979Q4-2016Q4; 1: 1979Q4-1998Q4; 2: 
1999Q1-2016Q4. Difference gives the value for IC0-(IC1+IC2), rank gives rank of the 
difference. Endogenous variables are y, dp, eq, ep, r, lr; except Finland where lr is not 
available. Exogenous variables are ys, dps, eqs, rs, lrs, poil. 
 
 
We next repeat the exercise treating 𝑟𝑖𝑖 , the short interest rate as exogenous, since it 
is controlled externally by the ECB for the euro countries in the second period (Table 
5). 
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Table 5: Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria for a euro structural break, m=6 
 Model k=6 k=5 k=4 
 Criterion    
Austria A 278.90 95.90 75.10 
 B 171.80 -2.80 -10.10 
Belgium A 217.20 106.70 82.20 
 B 117.70 -1.70 -14.30 
Finland A 147.20 56.17 39.50 
 B 47.00 -27.67 -13.50 
France A 246.70 132.10 110.70 
 B 156.50 51.60 51.10 
Germany A 223.90 152.90 120.80 
 B 124.40 59.90 33.30 
Italy A 198.90 152.70 123.60 
 B 104.40 69.90 72.10 
Netherlands A 220.60 113.00 66.20 
 B 120.20 30.20 21.30 
Norway A 144.10 92.50 73.10 
 B 87.40 14.60 13.00 
Spain A 249.20 98.90 71.50 
 B 148.70 -16.80 -7.60 
Sweden A 182.20 97.60 78.60 
 B 126.10 45.00 15.40 
Switzerland A 81.80 63.70 36.60 
 B 15.20 -13.50 -16.40 
UK A 140.90 72.50 50.40 
 B 62.60 5.60 -6.10 
Notes: Difference in AIC, A, and BIC, B, between whole period and two sub-periods. 
For 3 models. k=5: interest rates exogenous; k=4: interest rates and exchange rates 
exogenous. Negative value suggests no structural break. 
We thus see how large the structural break is controlling for interest rates. Since the 
size of the system changes from k=6 to k=5 (except for Finland where it changes from 
k=5 to k=4), we again need to choose (𝑝𝑒𝑖𝐴 , 𝑝𝑥𝑖𝐴 ) and 𝑟𝑖𝐴 and (𝑝𝑒𝑖𝐵 , 𝑝𝑥𝑖𝐵 ) and 𝑟𝑖𝐵 on the 
first period data. Assuming the real exchange rate, 𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑖, is controlled by the ECB, to an 
extent after the formation of the euro, we continue the analysis treating the exchange 
rate as exogenous. Hence, further reducing the number of endogenous variables in the 
system, from k=5 to k=4, except for Finland (in which case k=4 is reduced to k=3). The 
table gives the differences in the AIC and BIC between the whole period and the sum of 
the two sub-periods for the three cases. For k=6, the first column, the differences are the 
same as in the previous table. When one controls for the short interest rate and 
exchange rate, there is clearly less evidence for a structural break, suggesting that the 
main breaks came in interest rate and exchange rate equations. For half of the sample, 
namely for Austria, Belgium, Finland, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK, the difference 
of BIC is negative, meaning the model estimated over the whole period is preferred. 
The big reduction appears to come from the interest rate equation. 
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Table 6: Mean Error of Forecast 1999Q1-2016Q4, GDP 
 Level Growth 
 Single System Single System 
Austria 0.84 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 
Belgium 5.20 1.32 0.09 0.04 
Finland 10.33 -1.96 -0.16 -0.15 
France 3.88 0.22 -0.05 -0.06 
Germany -0.07 -2.61 0.02 0.05 
Italy -6.79 -8.94 0.35 -0.31 
Netherlands -5.95 -4.79 -0.16 -0.14 
Norway -11.02 -9.32 -0.32 -0.28 
Spain -8.80 -1.67 -0.15 -0.17 
Sweden 14.65 10.94 0.31 0.37 
Switzerland 13.10 3.05 0.15 0.08 
UK -58.78 0.74 -0.04 -0.13 
Notes: Level in percent; Growth in percentage points at annual rates. 
We compared the system and single equation results (Table 6). The level equations 
for log GDP seem unreliable, the series seem to be difference stationary rather than 
trend stationary. The mean errors of forecast for growth rates from systems and single 
equation estimates always the same sign and very similar in magnitude, difference less 
than 0.05 except for Sweden, Switzerland and UK. Of the non-euro countries 2 out of 4 
did worse than expected. The outliers among the 12 are non-euro: Sweden had the 
largest positive difference of actual over expected; Norway the largest negative 
difference. Of the euro countries 6 out of 8 did worse than expected. Germany and 
Belgium did slightly better, Italy much worse, Spain and Netherlands quite a lot worse. 
 
7 Conclusion 
From this analysis we can only really conclude that it is difficult to draw strong 
conclusions. The results are sensitive to a range of specification choices and the 
confidence intervals around counterfactuals are large. The main structural break seems 
to be in the interest and exchange rate equations, where there was a clear institutional 
change in their determination with the introduction of the euro. The date of the 
formation of euro is not identified as the most likely date for a structural break in the 
GDP equations and the GDP growth rate equation shows no structural break for many 
countries. There do not appear to be obvious differences in the patterns of structural 
breaks between euro and non-euro country equations. The effects of the euro are 
apparent everywhere except in the main macroeconomic equations. This may be 
significant. The formation of the euro was a major break which required a change in the 
patterns of economic relationships to provide alternative methods of economic 
adjustment to changes in interest and exchange rates. The fact that the economic 
relationships did not seem to have changed may have been a source of tensions for the 
euro. 
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